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LABOR LAW-PICKETING-CONSTITUTIONAL LAWFirst Amendment Challenges by Federal Employees
to the Broad Labor Picketing Proscription
of Executive Order 11491
[There is] a growing vocal element among federal employees •••
throughout the country-and its tune is one of resentment against
what it claims is a "Second-Class" citizenship. ••• [P]icketing and
protests are cropping up around the nation •••.1

J.

INTRODUCTION

In 1967, the White House was picketed by federal employees for
the first time in history.2 Although some 1,700 National Postal Union
(NPU) members took part in the peaceful picketing of the executive
mansion in protest of what they considered to be "peanut pay raises,"
no disciplinary measures were imposed upon the NPU or its members.3 However, one year later, a New York local of the National

I. Government Employee Relations Report [hereinafter G.E.R.R.] No. 208, at A9
(Sept. 4, 1967), See dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in United Pub. Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 124 (1947), quoted in note 100 infra.
2. G.E.R.R. No. 208, at A9 (Sept. 4, 1967). See also G.E.R.R. No. 194, at A4-A5 (May
29, 1967).
3. Id. That such disciplinary action could probably have been taken against the
National Postal Union (NPU) is demonstrated by the language of then-existing
§ 3.2(b) of the federal government's Code of Fair Labor Practices (CFLP), Memorandum
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Association of Government Employees (NAGE). which engaged in
similar peaceful picketing, did not fare as well.
In National Association of Government Employees v. White
(NAGE),4 after an impasse had been reached in collective bargaining
negotiations between the Environmental Science Services Administration of the Department of Commerce and the NAGE, twenty-two
union members peacefully picketed in front of the building in which
they worked as United States weathermen. The members also passed
out leaflets to the public that specifically indicated that the members
were not on strike. 5 The picketing was performed on the members'
own time, and there were no interruptions of any government services. Nonetheless, for the first time in the history of the federal government's labor relations program, sanctions were imposed upon a
union. 6 Mr. Robert White, Administrator of the Environmental Science Services Administration, decided that the NAGE demonstration
fell within the "picketing" prohibition of section 3.2(b)(4) of the
Code of Fair Labor Practices (CFLP),7 which prohibited unions from
picketing the federal government. As punishment for this violation,
he canceled the union's recognition and dues-checkoff rights for a
period of one year. 8 The NAGE then brought suit in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia for a ·writ of mandamus ordering Administrator White to reinstate the terminated
rights on the ground that the disciplinary action constituted a deprivation of the NAGE members' first amendment guarantees. The
district court, basing its decision on the doctrine of sovereign immunity, dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction.9 On appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and
of May 21, 1963, 3 C.F.R. 848-54 (comp. 1959-1963) (superseded Jan. 1, 1970), which
had been authorized by § 13(a) of President Kennedy's 1962 Executive Order, Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Service, Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3
C.F.R. 526 (comp. 1959-1963). See H. ROBERTS, LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN THE
PUBLIC SERVICE 40 (1968). CFLP § 3.2 provided, inter alia: "Employee organizations
are prohibited from: ••• (4) calling or engaging in any strike, work stoppage, slowdown, or related picketing engaged in as a substitute for any such strike, work stoppage
or slowdown, against the Government of the United States ••••" 3 C.F.R. 852-53
(comp. 1959-1963) (emphasis added). Under CFLP § 3.3(c), "remedies and sanctions"
could be imposed by the appropriate federal agency for violations of § 3.2(b)(4). 3
C.F.R. 854 (comp. 1959-1963).
4. No. 1617-68 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 1968), revd., 418 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert.
denied sub nom. Zimmerman v. United States, 399 U.S. 911 (1970).
5. The leaflets advocated the passage of congressional bills that would grant recognition to federal-employee unions and urged the public to write their Congressmen
concerning certain injustices and inefficiencies at the Weather Bureau. 418 F.2d at 1128.
6. See G.E.R.R. No. 243, at Al (May 6, 1968), and G.E.R.R. No. 251 at A5-A7 ijuly
1, 1968).
7. CFLP § 3.2(b)(4), Memorandum of May 21, 1963, 3 C.F.R. 853 (comp. 1959-1963).
8. 418 F.2d at 1126.
9. National Assn. of Govt. Employees v. White, No. 1617-68 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 1968),
reported in G.E.R.R. No. 271, at Al-A2 (Nov. 18, 1968).
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remanded the case for a determination of the merits, holding that
the action did not "founder on any rock of sovereign immunity."10
Although section 3.2(b)(4) of the CFLP has since been displaced
by President Nixon's Executive Order 11,491, "Labor-Management
Relations in the Federal Service,"11 the constitutional questions
raised by the NAGE situation are still highly pertinent, especially
for the 1,500,000 federal employees who are presently in collective
bargaining units exclusively represented by labor organizations.12
Section 19(b) of the new Executive Order provides, inter alia: "A
labor organization shall not ... (4) call or engage in a strike, work
stoppage, or slowdown; picket any agency in a labor-management
dispute; or condone any such activity by failing to take affirmative
action to prevent or stop it ... .''13 This Note will consider the constitutional validity of section 19(b)(4)'s broad prohibition against federal-employee labor picketing. However, before the first amendment
questions are considered, two preliminary issues should be discussed.

II. PRELIMINARY ISSUES
The district court in NAGE based its summary dismissal on the
theory of sovereign immunity.14 This jurisdictional doctrine is derived from the historical notion that "the king can do no ·wrong"
and from the premise that "[t]he interference of the courts with the
performance of the ordinary duties of the executive departments of
the government, would be productive of nothing but mischief."15
Thus, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the courts
have no general supervisory power over the proceedings and actions of administrative bodies in the government16 and that "a
suit against the Government [is one] over which the court, in the
absence of consent, has no jurisdiction."17
10. 418 F.2d at 1129-30. For a discussion of the district and circuit courts' reasoning,
see text accompanying notes 14-24 infra.
11. 3 C.F.R. 191-205 (comp. 1969). On January 1, 1970, this Executive Order wholly
displaced prior Executive Order 10,988. See note 3 supra.
12. See G.E.R.R. No. 297, at Dl-D6 (May 19, 1969).
13. Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 19(b)(4), 3 C.F.R. 202-03 (comp. 1969) (emphasis
added).
14. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
15. Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 515 (1840).
16. Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290, 292 (1900). See also Mississippi v. Johnson,
71 U.S. 475 (1866), in which the Court utilized the separation-of-powers rationale to
reach the conclusion that sovereign immunity bars a court from restraining the actions
of either the Congress or the President. For an opposing view, see Justice Brandeis'
dissent in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926): "The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to
preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by
means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers
among three departments, to save the people from autocracy."
17. Larson v. Domestic 8: Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689 (1949).
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Although the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had previously relied upon the sovereign immunity doctrine to
dismiss similar federal-employee-organization challenges to Government officials' conduct,18 it concluded that the particular circumstances involved in NA GE placed that case within one of the two
generally recognized exceptions to the doctrine. The Supreme Court
has held that the sovereign immunity rule does not apply when an
officer's actions exceed his statutory powers or when the power itself or the manner in which it is exercised is constitutionally void.19
Under either of these circumstances, according 'to the Court in Larson v. Domestic b Foreign Commerce Corporation,20 the officer
becomes dissociated from the sovereign so that "his actions . . .
are considered individual and not sovereign actions." 21 Thus, the
suit is viewed as being against the individual officer rather than the
sovereign. As a result of this reasoning, the Court has held that
sovereign immunity does not bar actions that fall under one of these
two exceptions.22
The plaintiffs in NAGE alleged that Administrator White's actions were unconstitutional because they unduly interfered with
the employees' first amendment rights to assemble, to speak freely,
and to petition Congress.23 Accepting such allegations, the court of
appeals properly concluded that because the plaintiffs' claim arose
under the Constitution, that claim fell under the exception of constitutional invalidity and hence was within the jurisdiction of the
federal courts.24
18. See National Assn. of Internal Revenue Employees v. Dillon, 356 F.2d 811 (D.C.
Cir. 1966); Manhattan-Bronx Postal Union v. Gronouski, 350 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966).
19. See Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 621-22 (1963); Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643
(1962). In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159 (1908), the Court recognized that
the use of the name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act • • • is a
proceeding without the authority of and one which does not affect the State in
its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part
of a state official in attempting by the use of the name of the State to enforce
a legislative enactment which is void because unconstitutional.
20. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
21. 337 U.S. at 689.
22. 337 U.S. at 689-90. See also Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962). For extended
discussions of the applicability of the sovereign immunity doctrine to judicial review
of federal administrative action, see Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory"
Judicial Review: Sovereign Immunity, Indispensable Parties, Mandamus, 75 HARV. L.
R.Ev. 1479 (1962); Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action:
The Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction,
and Parties Defendant, 68 MICH. L. R.Ev. 389 (1970); Davis, Suing the Government by
Falsely Pretending To Sue an Officer, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 435 (1962); Scalia, Sovereign
Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: Some Conclusions from the Public-Lands Cases, 68 MICH. L. R.Ev. 867 (1970).
23. 418 F.2d at 1129.
24. 418 F.2d at 1129. In holding that the plaintiffs had alleged a claim arising under
the Constitution, the court emphasized that "even where a privilege that has been
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Once the sovereign immunity hurdle is cleared, there are two
methods by which the constitutionality of Executive Order ll,49l's
no-labor-picketing provision might be challenged in the courts.25
A suit seeking declaratory relief could immediately be brought
under the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act,2 6 or a challenge
could be made following the imposition of disciplinary measures
after a labor organization had actually engaged in the proscribed
activity. 27 By either method, the suit would best be processed against
the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations
since, under section 6(a)(4) of the Executive Order,28 he is given the
responsibility for the resolution of unfair labor practice complaints.29
extended [by executive discretion] is capable of unilateral revocation, [as here,] the
administration of that privilege cannot be exercised in a manner which clashes with
basic constitutional safeguards. Judicial relief is available even when the privilege is not
rooted in a statute." 418 F.2d at lll!O. See Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 345 (1955);
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882);
Kauper, The Steel Seizure Case: The President and the Supreme Court, 51 MICH. L. REv.
141 (1952); Williams, The Impact of the Steel Seizures upon the Theory of Inherent
Sovereign Powers of the Federal Government, 5 S.C.L.Q. 5 (1952), See also Georgia
R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299 (1952); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918);
Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S 605 (1912); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908);
3 K. DAVIS, .ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE§ 27.03 (1958); Byse, supra note 22; Cramton,
supra note 22; Hochman, Judicial Review of Administrative Processes in Which the
President Participates, 74 HARv. L. REv. 684 (1961); Comment, Immunity of Government
Officers: Effects of the Larson Case, 8 STAN. L. REv, 683 (1956). But cf. Mine Safety
Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U.S. 371 (1945); Morrison v. Work, 266 U.S. 481 (1925).
Despite an allegation of unconstitutional government action, it might still be possible
to argue that sovereign immunity should prevent the attainment of satisfactory relief
when "the relief requested can not be granted by merely ordering the cessation of the
conduct complained of but will require affirmative action by the sovereign or the disposition of unquestionably sovereign property." Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 691 n.11 (1949). However, in a case involving § 19(b)(4) of Executive
Order ll,491, appropriate relief would clearly not require affirmative action to be taken
by the sovereign but would instead require only the cessation of illegal action or the
reinstatement of an improperly terminated right by a relatively minor Government
official-the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations, who, under
the Executive Order, is responsible for the administration of the unfair labor practice
provision. See notes 28-29 infra and accompanying text. For further explication of this
aspect of sovereign immunity, see 3 K. DAVIS, supra, § 27.01 (Supp. 1965).
25. The order could also be challenged in a defense to a suit brought by the
Government to enjoin picketing in violation of the order. However, because of the
constitutional problems of the order, see pt. V infra, the Government would undoubtedly apply administrative sanctions-such as those invoked in NAGE or even firingrather than place the order directly in issue in a judicial proceeding.
26. 28 u.s.c. §§ 2201-02 (1964).
27, Subject matter jurisdiction is clearly present in either event, for "where the

complaint ••• is so drawn as to seek recovery directly under the Constitution ••• the
federal court ••• must entertain the suit." Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1946).
28. 3 C.F.R. 195 (comp. 1969). See Special Supplement to G.E.R.R. No. 320, at 5 (Oct.
27, 1969).
29. This concentration of responsibility constituted a change from the practice that

had existed under the prior CFLP; that code authorized each separate agency to remedy
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Although there is no doubt that a court could entertain a suit
by a labor organization that had been disciplined for violating
the Executive Order's antipicketing provision,30 there is a possibility that a court would refuse to grant previolation relief in
the form of a declaratory judgment on the ground that the issue
was not ripe for determination. In United Public Workers v.
Mitchell, 31 several federal employees brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the Hatch Act, 32 which limited the right
of Government workers to engage in political activity, was unconstitutional. Although the employees alleged that their constitutional
freedoms were infringed by the threat of punishment under the Act,
they had not engaged in any actual conduct that subjected them
to disciplinary action. The Supreme Court stated that
federal courts do not render advisory opinions. For adjudication of
constitutional issues, "concrete legal issues, presented in actual cases,
not abstractions," are requisite. . . . The power of courts • . . to
pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress arises only when
the interests of litigants require the use of . . . judicial authority
for their protection against actual interference. A hypothetical
threat is not enough.33

Because of these considerations, the Court dismissed the appeal of
the appellants who were seeking declaratory relief.34
Subsequent cases, however, have greatly undermined the broad
doctrine enunciated in Mitchell concerning justiciability. In Dombrowski v. Pfister, 35 for example, the Court was faced with a suit
for declaratory relief from an allegedly overbroad state statute that
purportedly threatened appellants' constitutional rights to freedom
of expression.36 Although no prosecution had been processed against
the appellants under the statute in question, the Court decided that
the issue presented was justiciable and held the state law unconstituunfair labor practice violations. See CFLP
853-54 (comp. 1959-1963).

§

3.3, Memorandum of May 21, 1963, 3 C.F.R.

30. In such a case, the disciplinary sanctions would provide the basis for a case or
controversy between the union and the agency.
31. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
32. Act of Aug. 2, 1939, ch. 410, § 9, 53 Stat. 1148, as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 118i
(1964).
33. 330 U.S. at 89-90. See also 330 U.S. at 90 n.22.
34. While the Court's language regarding ripeness was very broad, it should be
emphasized that an additional factor was present in that case. Since one appellant bad
actually sustained adverse action as a result of bis previous political activity, the Court
was willing to render a determination of the merits with respect to his appeal. 330 U.S.
at 91-94. Had one of the appellants not been in such a position, the Court might not
have reached the same result with respect to the undisciplined appellants.
35. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
36. The Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law, LA. REv. STAT. §§
14.358-.374 (Cum. Supp. 1962), made it unlawful to be a member of a Communist-front
organization and to participate in the management of any subversive organization.
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tional.81 In rejecting an argument that the issue was not ripe for
determination, the Court said that when statutes
have an overbroad sweep . . • the hazard of loss or substantial
impairment of those precious [first amendment] rights may be
critical. For in such cases, the statutes lend themselves too readily
to denial of those rights. The assumption that defense of a criminal
prosecution will generally assure ample vindication of constitutional rights is unfounded in such cases. . . . For "[t]he threat of
sanctions may deter •.• almost as potently as the actual application
of sanctions. . . ." . • . Because of the sensitive nature of constitutionally protected expression, we have not required that all of
those subject to overbroad regulations risk prosecution to test their
rights. For free expression-of transcendent value to all society, and
not merely to those exercising their rights-might be the loser.38

The Court further observed that the threat of prosecutions for protected expression would continue so long as the statute were available to the state and that even the likelihood that such prosecutions
would ultimately fail would not mitigate "chilling effect on protected expression."39 Thus, in light of Dombrowski and other recent
cases40 and of the chilling effect of the order involved in NAGE,
it would appear probable that a court would be willing to grant
a declaratory judgment to a labor organization concerning the
constitutionality of Executive Order 11,491's broad antipicketing
provision.41
However, in a series of cases decided on February 23, 1971, the
Supreme Court appeared to restrict the application of the doctrine
enunciated in Dombrowski. The Court stated, in Younger v. Harris,42
"We do not think that [the Dombrowski] opinion stands for the
proposition that a federal court can properly enjoin enforcement of a
statute solely on the basis of a showing that the statute 'on its face'
37. 380 U.S. at 492.
38. 380 U.S. at 486, quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
39. 380 U.S. at 494.
40. See also Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964), in which the Court similarly
refused to apply the ripeness doctrine in a declaratory-judgment action challenging the
constitutionality of several Washington loyalty oath statutes; NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 435 (1963), in which the Court stated, "It makes no difference whether such
prosecutions or proceedings would actually be commenced. It is enough that a vague
and broad statute [restricting freedom of expression] lends itself to selective enforcement against unpopular causes."
41. See National Assn. of Letter Carriers v. Blount, 305 F. Supp. 546 (D.D.C. 1969),
prob. juris. noted, 397 U.S. 1962 (1970) (No. 1270), in which a district court granted
declaratory relief to a labor organization challenging the constitutionality of a part of
5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1964), relating to the right of federal employees to "assert the right to
strike" against the United States, or belong to a labor organization that does so. The
United States recently agreed to drop its appeal in this case. G.E.R.R. No. 365, at Al0
(Sept. 7, 1970).
42. 39 U.S.L.W. 4201 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1971).
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abridges First Amendment rights."48 It should be emphasized that
each of these cases involved plaintiffs against whom criminal proceedings actually had been initiated in state courts for violations of
state statutes and city ordinances. In refusing to uphold or grant
injunctions against these state prosecutions· on the grounds that such
prosecutions would infringe first amendment rights, the Court emphasized its "long-standing public policy against federal court interference with state court proceedings." 44 Since the focus of the Younger
group of cases appears to be on the preservation of the integrity of
the federal system and of state court proceedings rather than on
ripeness, these decisions do not necessarily prevent a federal court
from declaring a federal statute or executive order unconstitutional
before an actual violation has occurred. Nevertheless, the tenor of
the cases suggests that a challenge to Executive Order 11,491 would
most wisely be litigated after federal employees had engaged in picketing and had been disciplined-as in NAGE.

III.

PRIVATE-SECTOR PICKETING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Once the jurisdictional issues involved in a challenge of Executive Order 11,491, have been decided, the substantive question remains whether that order violates the first amendment. In order
to deal properly with this issue, it is necessary to examine the history of the first amendment's protection of picketing and of
public-employee conduct. This Note will first discuss the application
of the first amendment to labor picketing in the private sector.
During the past thirty-four years, labor picketing has been the
subject of a great deal of controversial constitutional analysis. In
1937, the Supreme Court, while upholding the constitutionality of
the Wisconsin "little Norris-LaGuardia" anti-injunction act's protection of peaceful labor picketing, recognized that "[m]embers of a
union might, without special statutory authorization by a state, make
known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution."45 Although this statement by
Justice Brandeis had not been made specifically in reference to
picketing itself, it was interpreted by many lawyers as implying "that
picketing-at least, peaceful picketing-is freedom of speech entitled
to the guarantees of the federal Constitution."46 Actually, such a con43. 39 U.SL.W. at 4206. See also Boyle v. Landry, 39 U.S.L.W. 4207 (U.S. Feb, 23,
1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 39 U.S.L.W. 4211 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 39
U.S.L.W. 4214 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1971); Dyson v. Stein, 39 U.S.L.W. 4231 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1971);
Byrne v. Karalexis, 39 U.S.L.W. 4236 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1971).
44. Younger v. Harris, 39 U.S.L.W. 4201, 4203 (U.S. Feb, 23, 1971).
45. Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 478 (1937).
46. C. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 295 (1961).
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clusion was not accepted by the Court until 1940 in Thornhill v.
Alabama;n
Thornhill involved a state statute that was interpreted by state
courts as rendering peaceful labor picketing a misdemeanor. The
Court stated that the first amendment protected the right publicly to
discuss public issues and that "the dissemination of information
concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within
that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution."48
It was the Court's opinion that public streets provide natural places
to disseminate information relating to labor disputes and that they
do not become inappropriate places merely because such dissemination could take place elsewhere.49 In concluding that the Alabama
statute was unconstitutionally broad, the Court emphasized that it
had been
applied by the State courts so as to prohibit a single individual from
walking slowly and peacefully back and forth on the public sidewalk in front of the premises of an employer, without speaking to
anyone, carrying a sign or placard on a staff above his head stating
only that the employer did not employ union men.... The statute
as thus authoritatively construed and applied leaves room for no
exceptions based upon either the number of persons engaged in the
proscribed activity, the peaceful character of their demeanor, the
nature of their dispute with an employer, or the restrained character
and the accurateness of the terminology used in notifying the public
of the facts of the dispute.ro

Although Thornhill and subsequent cases61 had provided peaceful labor picketing with the protections of the first amendment, it
was clear that such protection was not absolute. In Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 52 the Court had declared that "[w]hen clear and present
danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public
streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order,
appears, the power of the State to prevent or punish is obvious."53
This reasoning was followed in Milk Wagon Drivers, Local 753 v.
47. 810 U.S. 88 (1940).
48. 810 U.S. at 102. To support this statement, the Court cited Hague v. CIO,
807 U.S. 496 (1939); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 155, 162·63 (1939); Senn v. Tile
Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 478 (1937).
49. 310 U.S. at 103, 105-06.
50. 810 U.S. at 98-99.
51. In Carlson v. California, 810 U.S. 106 (1940), the Court further recoguized the
free speech aspect of labor picketing by invalidating another overly broad state antipicketing statute. It noted that "[t]he carrying of sigus and banners, no less than the
raising of a flag, is a natural and appropriate means of conveying information on
matters of public concern." 810 U.S. at 112-18. See also Bakery Drivers Loca~ 802 v.
Wohl, 815 U.S. 769 (1942); AFL v. Swing, 812 U.S. 287 (1941).
52. 810 U.S. 296 (1940).
58. 810 U.S. at 808.
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Meadowmoor Dairies, Incorporated, 54 in which a broad state court
injunction against picketing was upheld due to the pervasive acts
of violence that had accompanied the picketing. While the Court
recognized that the "[r]ight to free speech in the future cannot be
forfeited because of dissociated acts of past violence," 55 it emphasized
that the picketing involved in that case had been "set in a background of violence." 56 The Court therefore concluded that the
state could justifiably enjoin future picketing in that particular labor
dispute. 57
In 1942, the Court appeared to diverge more fundamentally from
the broad free speech approach to picketing embodied in Thornhill
when it upheld a state court injunction of labor picketing issued on
grounds other than violence. In Carpenters, Local 213 v. Ritters
Cafe, 58 a union picketed Ritter's restaurant solely for the purpose of
protesting his hiring of a non-union contractor to erect an unrelated
building 1½ miles from the restaurant. The picketing, which caused
a cessation of work and deliveries at the restaurant, was found to
be for the purpose of forcing Ritter to require the nonunion contractor to employ only union members and therefore to be in violation
of the state antitrust law.59 In upholding the state court injunction
against picketing of the restaurant itself, the Supreme Court stated
that
recognition of peaceful picketing as an exercise of free speech does
not imply that the states must be without power to confine the
sphere of communication to that directly related to the dispute.
Restriction of picketing to the area of the industry within which a
labor dispute arises leaves open to the disputants other traditional
modes of communication.60

Thus, by applying the "unlawful-purpose" doctrine, 61 the Court in
Ritter's Cafe appeared to accept the notion that labor picketing constitutes more than "pure speech."
Although the Court had in several instances during the l 940's
54. 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
55. 312 U.S. at 296. Prior restraints on free speech are discussed in Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697 (1931). See also Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW 8:
CoNTEMP. PROB. 648 (1955); Glenn, Censorship at Common Law and Under Modern
Dispensation, 82 U. PA. L. REY. 114 (1933).
56. 312 U.S. at 294.
57. 312 U.S. at 294-95.
58. 315 U.S. 722 (1942).
59. 315 U.S. at 723-24.
60. 315 U.S. at 727-28.
61. See Giboney v. Empire Storage 8c Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949), in which the Court

further developed the unlawful-purpose doctrine by noting that there is no "constitutional right in picketers to take advantage of speech or press to violate valid laws
designed to protect important interests of society." 336 U.S. at 501.
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upheld state court antipicketing injunctions when a "clear and
present danger" of violence or coercion accompanied the picketing62
or when the primary purpose of the picketing was the accomplishment of an illegal objective,63 it usually adhered to the Thornhill
premise that peaceful labor picketing was subject to the full protection of the first amendment. 64 However, by 1950, it was apparent
that the Court was having difficulty with the "pure speech" concept
and was beginning to re-examine its Thornhill doctrine. In Hughes
v. Superior Court of the State of California, 65 the Court upheld a
state court injunction against picketing that had been aimed at
forcing local businessmen to hire a minimum percentage of Negro
workers; such coercion was held to be in violation of a state antidiscrimination policy. 66 Although the established unlawful-purpose
doctrine clearly covered the situation, the Court utilized the occasion
to indicate in dictum its belief that
[i]ndustrial picketing "is more than free speech, since it involves
patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of a picket
line may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of
the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated." . . . [T]he
very purpose of a picket line is to exert influences, and it produces
consequences, different from other modes of communication.67
In two companion cases, the Court further emphasized that it did not
consider peaceful picketing to be pure speech. In Teamsters, Local
309 v. Hanke, 68 while upholding a similar state court injunction
against peaceful picketing that interfered with an established state
policy, the Court recognized that picketing "cannot dogmatically be
equated with the constitutionally protected freedom of speech." 69
The Court concluded that it had "to strike a balance between the
62. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 54-57 supra.
63. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
64. See, e.g., Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943), in which
the Supreme Court invalidated a state court injunction against labor picketing despite
the fact that the picketing had earlier been accompanied by a few acts of coercion. The
Court concluded that "the right to picket itself [cannot] be taken away merely because
there may have been isolated incidents of abuse falling far short of violence occurring
in the course of that picketing.'' 320 U.S. at 296.
For analyses of the labor picketing cases of the early I940's see C. GREGORY, supra
note 46, ch. XI; Dodd, Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent, 56 HARV. L. REv.
513 (1943); Gregory, Peaceful Picketing and Freedom of Speech, 26 A.B.A.J. 709 (1940);
Jaffe, In Defense of the Supreme Court's Picketing Doctrine, 41 MICH. L. REv. 1037
(1943); Teller, Picketing and Free Speech, 56 HARv. L. REV. 180 (1942); Teller, Picketing
and Free Speech: A Reply, 56 HARv. L. REv. 532 (1943).
65. 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
66. 339 U.S. at 468-69.
67. 339 U.S. at 464-65, quoting Bakery Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769,
775 (1942) Oustice Douglas, concurring).
68. 339 U.S. 470 (1950).
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constitutional protection of the element of communication in picketing and 'the power of the State to set the limits of permissible contest
open to industrial combatants.' " 70 Similar language was used by
the Court in Building Service Employees, Local 262 v. Gazzam, 11 in
which it also upheld a state court antipicketing injunction by use of
the unlawful-purpose doctrine. Thus, it appeared that although
Thornhill had not been specifically overruled, its underlying rationale had been significantly eroded.72
Throughout most of the 1950's, the Court continued to recognize
that labor picketing constituted much more than pure speech for
constitutional purposes.73 However, in 1958 the Court demonstrated
that it still intended to accord peaceful labor picketing some constitutional protection. In Teamsters, Local 795 v. Newell, 14 the Court
in a per curiam decision invalidated a broad state court antipicketing
injunction and cited Thornhill v. Alabama. Further evidence of the
Court's refusal to reject entirely the Thornhill doctrine was provided
69. 339 U.S. at 474.
70. 339 U.S. at 474, quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, lHO U.S. 88, 104 (1940).
71. 339 U.S. 532 (1950).
72. For some interesting analyses of the Supreme Court's treatment of picketing
through the 1950's, see Cox, The Influence of Mr. Justice Murphy on Labor Law, 48
MICH. L. R.Ev. 767, 774-82, 787-93 (1950); Fraenkel, Peaceful Picketing-Constitutionally
Protected?, 99 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 1 (1950); Gordon, Giboney v. Empire Storage if Ice Co.:
A Footnote to Free Speech, 36 VA. L. R.Ev. 25 (1950); Gregory, Constitutional Limitations
on the Regulation of Union and Employer Conduct, 49 MICH. L. R.Ev. 191, 198-208
(1950); Gregory, Picketing and Coercion: A Defense, 39 VA. L. R.Ev. 1053 (1953); Gregory,
Picketing and Coercion: A Conclusion, 39 VA. L. R.Ev. 1067 (1953); Jones, Picketing and
Coercion: A Jurisprudence or Epithets, 39 VA. L. R.Ev. 1023 (1953); Jones, The Right
To Picket-Twilight Zone of the Constitution, 102 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 995 (1954); Rehmus,
Picketing and Freedom of Speech, 30 CRE. L. R.Ev. 115 (1951); Smith, The Supreme
Court and Labor, 1950-1953, 8 Sw. L.J. I, 10-11 (1954); Tanenhaus, Picketing-Free
Speech: The Growth of the New Law of Picketing from 1940-1952, 38 CORNELL L.Q. 1
(1952); Comment, Constitutional Law-Due Process of Law-Thornhill Re-examined, 49
Mica. L. R.Ev. 1048 (1951). See also Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VAND.
L. R.Ev. 574, 591-602 (1951); Jones, Free Speech: Pickets on the Grass, Alas! Amidst
Confusion, A Consistent Principle, 29 S. CAL. L. R.Ev. 137 {1956); Jones, The Loder
Letter-Have Union Picketers Finally Found the Formula, 44 UCLA L. R.Ev. 370 (1957);
Jones, Picketing and the Communication of Ideas, 42 UCLA L. R.Ev. 212 (1955).
73. See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. 8: Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951);
Plumbers Union v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953); Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc.,
354 U.S. 284 (1957); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1957).
74. 356 U.S. 341 (1958) (per curiam). See also NLRB v. Drivers, Local 639, 362
U.S. 274 (1960), in which the Court held that peaceful "recognition" picketing does
not "restrain or coerce" employees within the meaning of § 8(b)(l)(A) of the National
Labor Relations Act [hereinafter NLRA], 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(l)(A) (1964). That section
makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to "restrain or coerce" employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed them by the NLRA. Section 8(b)(7) of the NLRA, 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1964), now regulates recognitional and organizational picketing. See
Smitley d/b/a Crown Cafeteria v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1964), regarding the
right of a union to engage in § 8(b)(7) picketing "for the purpose of truthfully advising
the public ••••" See also Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National
Labor Relations Act, 44 MINN. L. R.Ev. 257, 265-70 (1959).
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six years later in NLRB v. Fruit b Vegetable Packers b Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 75 a case involving the relationship between peaceful consumer picketing and the prohibition of secondary
picketing contained in section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).76 In that case, the Court interpreted the scope of
section 8(b)(4) in a narrow manner in order to avoid the constitutional issue that otherwise would have been presented, because it
recognized that "a broad ban against peaceful picketing might collide
with the guarantees of the First Amendment." 77 The Court's constitutional struggle with labor picketing continued in Amalgamated
Food Employees Union, Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, lncorporated.18 Although the Court began its analysis in that case "from the
premise that peaceful picketing carried on in a location open generally to the public is, absent other factors involving the purpose or
manner of the picketing, protected by the First Amendment," 79 it
noted that prior decisions had recognized that "picketing involves
elements of both speech and conduct, i.e., patrolling, and [had] indicated that because of this intermingling of protected and unprotected elements, picketing [could] be subjected to controls that
would not be constitutionally permissible in the case of pure
speech."80 However, it emphasized that "no case ... can be found to
support the proposition that the non-speech aspects of peaceful
picketing are so great as to render the provisions of the First Amendment inapplicable to it altogether.''81 Since the peaceful picketing involved in Logan Valley was not aimed at achieving an illegal objective, the Court concluded that it was within the protection afforded
by the first amendment.82
IV.

PICKETING BY PUBLIC EMPLOYEES

Although it is clear from the preceding discussion of the relevant
Supreme Court decisions that peaceful labor picketing by privatesector employees is entitled to at least some first amendment protec75. '!,77 U.S. 58 (1964).
76. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1964). See note 74 supra. "Secondary picketing" involves
picketing of an employer not involved in the labor dispute. Brotherhood of R.R. Train•
men v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., '!,94 U.S. '!,69, '!,88 (1969).
77. '!,77 U.S. at 6'!,. But cf. Lewis, Consumer Picketing and the Supreme Court-The
Questionable Yield of Tree Fruits, 49 Mnm. L. REv. 479 (1965).
78. '!,91 U.S. '!,08 (1968).
79. '!,91 U.S. at '!,I'!,, citing Teamsters, Local 795 v. Newell, 356 U.S. 341 (1958); Bakery
Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, '!,15 U.S. 769 (1942); AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
80. 391 U.S. at 31'!,.
81. 391 U.S. at 314.
82. 391 U.S. at 314-15.
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tion, there are special circumstances present with respect to
public-sector employees that should be considered. Unlike privatesector employees, whose right to strike is protected by section 13 of
the NLRA,83 federal government employees are prohibited from
engaging in work stoppages of any kind. 84 It is highly probable,
therefore, that if federal workers were to engage in peaceful picketing
in conjunction with an illegal strike, the picketing could be constitutionally enjoined-along with the strike-as being in furtherance of
an illegal activity.85 Conversely, when peaceful labor picketing by federal employees is neither in furtherance of a strike, nor aimed at the
achievement of an unlawful objective, it may be contended that such
activity should be afforded greater first amendment protection than
is afforded most private-sector labor picketing. Although private-sector labor picketing is at least partially communicative in nature, it is
frequently used as a "signal" to induce fellow union members to
cease doing business with the picketed employer. 86 Because federal
employees may not legally utilize picketing for such purposes,87 they
are restricted to engaging in only pure informational picketing. Consequently, such activity more closely resembles nonlabor picketing
than labor picketing. It may therefore be contended that the constitutional protection afforded their activity should be determined by
reference to Supreme Court decisions that have involved nonlabor
picketing.
Although the Court has applied the unlawful-purpose doctrine88
to some areas of nonlabor picketing when the governmental interest
being protected was substantial,89 the Court has often provided
greater constitutional protection for this type of picketing than for
labor picketing. For example, in Edwards v. South Carolina,90 the
Court overturned a state breach-of-peace conviction of 187 blacks
who had engaged in peaceful informational picketing at the South
Carolina Statehouse in protest of racial segregation.91 The Court
83. 29 u.s.c. § 163 (1964).
84. See 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1964), which prohibits strikes by federal employees; 18 U.S.C.
§ 1918 (1964), which authorizes the imposition of penalties for violations of 5 U.S.C. §
7311.
85. See Tennessee Valley Authority v. Local Union 110, 233 F. Supp. 997 (W.D. Ky.
1962). See also Note, Labor Relations in the Public Service, 75 HARV. L. R.Ev. 391, 441
n.118 (1961).
86. See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. 8: Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951). See
also Cox, 48 MICH. L. R.Ev. 767, supra note 72, at 787-93; Cox, 4 VAND. L REY. 574,
supra note 72, at 591-602.
87. See note 84 and text accompanying note 85 supra.
88. See text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
89. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460
(1950), discussed in text accompanying notes 65-67 supra. See also Cameron v. Johnson,
390 U.S. 611 (1968).
90. 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
91. 372 U.S. at 237.

April 1971]

Notes

971

emphasized that the demonstration involved no violence or threat of
violence on the part of either the demonstrators or the white
onlookers and that there was ample police protection. 92 In holding
that a conviction under these circumstances could not stand-despite
the volatile nature of racial demonstrations in the South-Justice
Stewart, speaking for the majority, observed that the Constitution
"does not permit a State to make criminal the peaceful expression of
unpopular views." 93 The Court then quoted extensively from Ter-

miniello v. Chicago94 ;
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to
invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it
induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions
as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative
and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and
have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an
idea. That is why freedom of speech . . . is . . • protected against
censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear
and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above
public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. . . . There is no room
under our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the alternative would lead to standardization of ideas, either by legislatures,
courts, or dominant political or community groups.95
Since the atmosphere surrounding peaceful nonstrike informational
picketing in a public-employee labor dispute is normally far less
volatile than that which surrounded southern racial demonstrations
92. 372 U.S. at 235-36.
93. 372 U.S. at 237.
94. 337 U.S. I, 4-5 (1949). In Terminiello, the Court set aside a breach-of-peace con-

viction of a speaker who "vigorously, if not viciously" criticized certain political and
racial groups. Demonstrators outside the auditorium in which the defendant spoke had
reacted by tossing stink bombs, breaking windows, and trying to tear clothes off members of the audience.
95. 372 U.S. at 237-38. See Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776 (1964). See also
Note, Labor Relations in the Public Service, 75 HARV. L. REv. 391, 4II (1961), in which
it is urged that purely informational picketing by public employees should "fall within
the constitutional protection of free speech and of the right to petition the government
for redress of grievances."
Of course, even if peaceful public-employee picketing were afforded full first
amendment protection, it would still be subject to the same limitations as is all "pure
speech." See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) ("clear and present
danger" test); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (same); Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298 (1957) (distinguishing between mere "advocacy" and actual "incitement"
of violence); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity). See also Gorfinkel &:
Mack, Dennis v. United States and the Clear and Present Danger Rule, 39 CALIF. L.
REv. 475 (1951); Lockhart &: McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5 (1960); Lockhart &: McClure, Literature, the
Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REv. 295 (1954); Mendelson, Clear
and Present Danger-From Schenck to Dennis, 52 Courn. L. REv. 313 (1952); Richardson, Freedom of Expression and the Function of Courts, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1951).
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during the early 1960's, it seems clear that the approach adopted in
Edwards protects both forms of picketing.
The Edwards approach strongly indicates that federal employees
should be at least afforded the constitutionally protected right to
engage in peaceful informational picketing in order to bring the
pressure of public opinion to bear on their labor dispute when
economic weapons-such as strikes-are unavailable. Nevertheless,
it may be argued that by accepting employment with the Government, federal employees forfeit such a privilege.96 In United Public
Workers v. Mitchell, 91 a case concerning the constitutionality of the
Hatch Act's prohibition of federal employees from engaging in political activity,98 the Court observed: "Congress and the administrative
agencies have authority over the discipline and efficiency of the
public service. When actions of civil servants in the judgment of
Congress menace the integrity and the competency of the service,
legislation to forestall such danger and adequate to maintain its usefulness is required." 99 The Court therefore upheld the constitutionality of the Hatch Act restrictions.100 In Adler v. Board of Education,101 the Court upheld against similar constitutional attack the
New York Feinberg Law,102 which required loyalty oaths of schooJ
teachers. Although the Court asserted in Adler that such public
employees "have no right to work for the State in the school
system on their own terms,"103 it subsequently stated, in Wieman
v. Updegraff, 104 that "constitutional protection does extend to the
public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently
arbitrary or discriminatory."105 But, despite the language used by the
Court, more recent decisions seem to indicate that when the efficiency
96. See, e.g., McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892),
which upheld the discharge of a policeman for engaging in prohibited political activity.
The court noted: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but
he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." See also Eic parte Curtis, 106 U.S.
371 (1882), which upheld a similar restriction on the rights of certain federal employees.
97. 330 U.S. 75 (1947). See notes 31-34 supra and accompanying text for a discussion
of the jurisdictional issue in this case.
98. Act of Aug. 2, 1939, ch. 410, § 9, 53 Stat. 1148, as amended 5 U.S.C. § 118i (1964).
99. 330 U.S. at 103.
100. 330 U.S. at 103. Cf. Mr. Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion, in which he stated
that "[a]bsent coercion, improper use of government position or government funds, or
neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty, federal employees have the same
rights as do other citizens under the Constitution. They are not second-class citizens."
330 U.S. at 124.
101. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
102. N.Y. Enuc. LAW§ 3022 (McKinney 1949).
103. 342 U.S. at 492. The Court commented that persons "may work for the school

system upon the reasonable terms laid down by the proper authorities of New York."
842 U.S. at 492. See also Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D,C. Cir. 1950), afjd. per
curiam by equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
104. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
105. 344 U.S. at 192,
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or integrity of the public service is involved, it will permit some
restriction on the constitutional rights of the public employees involved.
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the University of the State of
New York, 106 the Court severely restricted the right of a state to
abridge, through loyalty oath requirements, the first amendment
rights of public employees. In holding that a state could not dismiss
a state university professor merely for his knowing membership in
the Communist Party without a showing of specific intent to further
the party's unlawful aims,107 the Court noted that "the theory that
public employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been
uniformly rejected."108 The implication in this statement that some
reasonable restrictions on the rights of public employees would be
constitutionally permissible was fortified in Pickering v. Board of
Education of Township High School District 205.109 Although the
Court in that case purportedly rejected the notion that public
employees may constitutionally be required to waive rights of free
speech enjoyed by private citizens, it recognized that
the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its
employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. The
problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests
of the [public employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters
of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through
its employees.110
Thus, despite the fact that the Court is willing to permit some restrictions on the constitutional rights of public employees when dictated
by the requirements of efficiency and integrity, it is clear that it will
not tolerate unreasonable infringement of fundamental freedoms. In
Pickering, for example, the Court found that the activity that had
been engaged in-writing a letter to a local newspaper criticizing
the way the school board and superintendent had handled proposals
to raise school revenue111-had interfered with neither the performance of the public employee's duties nor the general operation
106. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
107. 385 U.S. at 606,10.
108. 385 U.S. at 605,06, citing Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 860 (1964): Cramp v. Board
of Pub. Instruction, 386 U.S. 278 (1961): Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960);
Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956): Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183
(1952).
109. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
110. 391 U.S. at 568.
111. 391 U.S. at 564.
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of the public service.112 It concluded that in such circumstances, "the
interest of the ... administration in limiting [the public employee's]
opportunities to contribute to public debate is not significantly
greater than its interest in limiting a similar contribution by any
member of the general public.''113 Therefore, the Court held unreasonable the infringement of the employee's first amendment rights. 114
V.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF EXECUTIVE

ORDER

11,491

With this background of the applicability of the first amendment
to picketing and to public employees in mind, the reasonableness of
Executive Order ll,491's broad antilabor picketing provision may
properly be considered. The language of section 19(b)(4) of the order
clearly prohibits all labor picketing of Government agencies; it is not
confined to situations either where there is a "clear and present danger" of disruption of the public service115 or where the picketing is
intended to achieve an illegal objective.116 Thus, even accepting the
narrow premise that peaceful labor picketing involves more than free
speech, it is submitted that Executive Order ll,491's provision is
unreasonably restrictive.
In United States v. O'Brien,111 the Court recognized that when an
individual's conduct involves both speech and nonspeech elements,
first amendment freedoms may be incidentally restricted if the
government has a strong interest in regulating the nonspeech element.118 The Court stated that such regulation is justified "if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
112. 391 U.S. at 570-75.
I 13. 391 U.S. at 572-73. See also Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist., 393
U.S. 508 (1969), which involved the right of school authorities to restrict the free expression of pupils. The Court commented in that case that "where there is no finding and
no showing that the exercise of the forbidden right would 'materially and substantially
interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,'
the prohibition cannot be sustained." 393 U.S. at 509.
114. 391 U.S. at 574-75. See also Muller v. Conlisk, 429 F.2d 901, 902 (7th Cir. 1970)
(Chicago Police Department rule prohibiting police from "[e]ngaging in any activity,
conversation, deliberation, or discussion which is derogatory to the Department or any
member or policy of the Department" held unconstitutionally broad); Melton v. City of
Atlanta, 39 U.S.L.W. 2469 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 1971) (Georgia state statute prohibiting
policemen from joining a labor union held unconstitutional under first and fourteenth
amendments).
115. See text accompanying notes 52-57 supra.
116. See notes 58-60 supra and accompanying text.
117. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In this case, the Court upheld convictions under federal law
of three young men for burning their draft cards.
118. 391 U.S. at 376.
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greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."119 This
statement is consistent with the well-established doctrine that
a legitimate and substantial governmental purpose cannot be pursued by means that unnecessarily abridge fundamental first amendment liberties; such an abridgment offends the Constitution if the
governmental purpose that it is intended to further could be accomplished through less drastic means. 120
It is not contended that restrictions on federal-employee labor
picketing may never be imposed; indeed, an Executive Order could
properly be drafted that would prevent the utilization of labor picketing either to disrupt governmental services-as is already prohibited by existing law121-or to aid in the achievement of an illegal
objective.122 However, it is submitted that such specific restrictions
would sufficiently protect government interests to render unnecessary
-and hence constitutionally impermissible-an order prohibiting
all federal-employee picketing. A narrow order, which would prohibit disruptive and unlawful-purpose picketing, would prevent
picketing by federal employees pursuant to unlawful strikes but
would allow nondisruptive informational picketing such as that
involved in NAGE. 123 Since a narrow order would accomplish the
Government's interest in "promoting the efficiency of the public
services,"124 the broader Executive Order 11,491-which unnecessarily restricts federal employees' first amendment rights to freedom
of expression-is "greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest"125 and is therefore unconstitutional.
There is yet another reason why the right of federal employees to
engage in peaceful labor picketing that does not seek the achievement of an unlawful objective should not be restricted. When
federal workers are dissatisfied with their present working conditions
they must look to their employer-the federal government-for
II9. 391 U.S. at 376-77.
120. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). See also Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S.
17 (1968); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S.
500 (1964); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Freund, Competing
Freedoms in American Constitutional Law, 13 U. CHI. CoNF. SER. 26, 32-33 (1953);
Richardson, Freedom of Expression and the Function of Courts, 65 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1, 6,
23-24 (1951), cited by the Court in Shelton at 364 U.S. at 488 n.9.
121. See note 84 supra. A three-judge district court recently held that the first
and fifth amendments do not bar an absolute ban on strikes by federal employees.
Postal Clerks v. Blount, 39 U.S. L.W. 2565 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 1971).
122, See note 61 and text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
123. See text accompanying notes 4-5 supra.
124. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). See text accompanying
note IIO supra.
125. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). See text accompanying note
119 supra.
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proper redress of their grievances. A century ago, in United States v.
Cruikshank,126 the Court recognized:
The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of
petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for anything else
connected with the powers or duties of the national government, is
an attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under the protection of, and guaranteed by, the United States. The very idea of a
government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its
citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs
and to petition for a redress of grievances.127
Although it might be argued that the constitutional right to petition
the government for a redress of grievances was not intended to apply
when there is an employee-employer relationship between the
petitioner and the federal government, it is submitted that such a
conclusion would impose an unreasonable "second-class" citizenship128 upon such employees. This proposition is supported by the
Supreme Court's statement in Pickering v. Board of Education that
a government's interest in limiting a public employee's right to
exercise nondisruptive freedom of expression is no greater than its
interest in limiting the similar rights of private citizens.129 It should
also be emphasized that by permitting federal employees to petition
the Government-i.e., their employer-through resort to peaceful informational picketing for redress of labor grievances, the general
public may be benefited since the possible expedient alleviation of
the conditions that are disturbing the employees will best insure the
smooth and efficient operation of the public service.130
The Supreme Court recently stated in United States v. Robel: 131
For almost two centuries, our country has taken singular pride in
the democratic ideals enshrined in its Constitution, and the most
cherished of those ideals have found expression in the First Amendment. It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense,
126. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
127. 92 U.S. at 553.
128. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 124 (1947) Oustice Douglas, dissenting). See note 100 and text accompanying note 1 supra.
129. 391 U.S. at 568. See text accompanying note 110 supra.
130. The great importance of nondisruptive dispute settlement measures was
illustrated by the devastating consequences of the recent postal strike and of the air
traffic controller "slowdown." See N.Y. Times, March 23, 1970, at 1, cols. 6-8; id., March
22, 1970, at 1, cols. 7-8; id., March 21, 1970, at 1, cols. 5-8; id., March 20, 1970, at 1,
cols. 6-8; id., March 19, 1970, at 1, cols. 7-8. See also G.E.R.R. No. 341, at A5-A8
(March 23, 1970).
131. 389 U.S. 258 (1967). Robel involved a conviction under § 5(a)(l)(D) of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 784(a)(l)(D) (1964), of a member of
the Communist Party for having willfully engaged in employment at a shipyard after
the Secretary of Defense had designated it a defense facility.
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we would sanction the subversion of one of those liberties .
which makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile.132
It would similarly be ironic if the Government were permitted to
stifle the free expression of its employees in order to prevent its being
embarrassed in the eyes of public opinion by federal-employee picketing. Yet this is apparently the principal-if not the only-objective
achieved by the very broad labor picketing prohibition contained
in section 19(b)(4).1aa
In conclusion, it is submitted that section 19(b)(4) of Executive
Order 11,491 clearly exceeds the bounds of reasonable regulation,
thereby impermissibly infringing the first amendment rights of
Government workers. Therefore, a federal court should not hesitate
to take jurisdiction over a federal-employee union's challenge of that
order and to provide the relief required in order fully to protect the
fundamental rights of Government employees.
132. 389 U.S. at 264. See also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
133. As was demonstrated by the NAGE employees in New York City, there need be
no disruption of the public service when federal workers engage in peaceful picketing.
See notes 4-5 supra and accompanying text.

